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Abstract 
This paper provides an overview of the sequential shift towards activating 
labour market and social policy in Germany. It not only shows the changes 
in the instruments of active and passives labour market policies but also 
analyzes the implications of this change for the political economy, the 
governance and the legal structure of a “Bismarckian” welfare state. Our 
study points at the changes in Germany’s status- and occupation-oriented 
unemployment benefit regime that has been relinquished for a larger 
share of dependent population. Unemployment insurance benefit duration 
is shorter now and newly created basic income support for needy persons 
is not earnings-related anymore. Pressure on unemployed to take up jobs 
has increased considerably while more persons than before have access to 
employment assistance. The paper also aims at a preliminary assessment 
of the effects of activating labour market policy on labour market as well 
as social outcomes and sets out probable paths of future adaptation.  
 
JEL-Classification: J68 
Keywords:  activation, unemployment insurance, unemployment assis-
tance, basic income scheme, active labour market policy, 
Germany 
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1 Introduction 
Although Germany has a long-standing reputation as a passive welfare 
state with elaborate schemes of status-protecting income replacement 
through social insurance in case of unemployment and a full-blown system 
of active labour market policies, all benefit systems had formal elements 
of activation and work requirement – but they had not been enforced sys-
tematically.  
In recent years, however, reforms of active and passive labour market 
policy were implemented in Germany in order to create a more activating 
labour market and social policy regime and awake dormant activation 
principles. Changing the system of unemployment insurance benefits and 
basic income support as well as the repertoire of active labour market pol-
icy instruments and making benefit receipt more conditional upon job 
search and acceptance of job offers was a major issue on the political 
agenda. The reform of the benefit system also involved a major overhaul 
of the governance of labour market policy and has far-reaching implica-
tions for the logic of the German welfare state. All these reforms gener-
ated considerable public attention and interest from foreign observers. 
Yet, it remains to be seen to what extent activation is really implemented 
in practice and if the desired economic and societal objectives of activation 
could be achieved through the reforms adopted.  
2 The Shift towards Activation 
2.1 The Legacy of a Conservative European Welfare State 
The German welfare state is typically depicted as the prime example of 
the conservative welfare regime, for which the preservation of social 
status is central (Esping-Andersen 1990). It has also been prominently 
characterized as a “frozen welfare state” highly resistant to change 
(Manow/Seils 2000). Facing a difficult economic environment since the 
mid-seventies, policy makers and social partners used active and passive 
labour market policies to reduce labour supply by taking “surplus labour” 
out of the labour market and shifting the unemployed to benefit schemes 
and active programs that were not effectively oriented towards swift rein-
tegration into the labour market (Manow/Seils 2000). For some decades, 
active and passive labour market policies provided a “convenient” and “so-
cially compatible” way of subsidizing entrepreneurial adjustment to dy-
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namic global markets and help stabilize competitiveness of manufacturing 
that was at the core of the German employment system (Streeck 1997) 
while at the same time facilitating a “social policy” approach to unem-
ployment emphasizing income protection and “benevolent” treatment 
through active policies.  
Availability of rather generous insurance based social benefits1 related to 
labour market status in the tradition of the “Bismarckian” model helped 
limiting income inequality and wage dispersion. Rather than creating a 
flexible and more inclusive labour market, the institutional arrangement of 
the German labour market of the eighties and nineties was conducive to 
limiting low-wage employment and wage inequality. This model focusing 
skilled labour was also stabilized by rather restrictive labour market regu-
lation (Estevez-Abe/Iversen/Soskice 2001). 
Whereas this institutional pattern helped stabilize the core of the labour 
market, it also resulted in a strong segmentation of the labour market and 
high long-term unemployment. However, the German “high equality, low 
activity” equilibrium (Streeck 2001) resulted in an ever increasing burden 
of non-wage labour costs as a growing number of benefit recipients in the 
labour market directly translated into rising social security contributions 
and fiscal pressure on the state budget that was used to cover deficits in 
social insurance. Thus, the sustainability of the German “welfare state 
without work” (Esping-Andersen 1996) was at risk as it tended to erode 
its own financial basis in particular facing increasing pressure on wage 
costs stemming from more intense international competition (Manow/Seils 
2000). 
2.2 The old system of unemployment benefits 
Prior to the Hartz reforms that came into force between 2002 and 2005, 
Germany had a three-tier system of income protection in case of unem-
ployment: 
1. Unemployment insurance benefit (UB, Arbeitslosengeld) provided earn-
ings-related income replacement for a limited duration of up to 32 
                                                
1  The net replacement rate for an average production worker in the initial phase of un-
employment in 2002 was 61 percent in Germany compared to 45 percent in UK, 55 
percent in Austria, 59 percent in Denmark and 71 per cent in France (OECD 2004).  
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months if unemployed had been in employment covered by social insur-
ance for at least 12 months. Unemployment insurance benefits were 
funded through employer and employee contributions and administered 
by the Federal Employment Agency which was also in charge of imple-
menting active labour market policies. 
2. Unemployment assistance (UA, Arbeitslosenhilfe) was a system of 
means-tested, but earnings-related benefits for long-term unemployed 
after the expiry of unemployment insurance benefits. Hence, it provided 
income support for unemployed people who had some prior employ-
ment experience but had become long-term unemployed. Unemploy-
ment assistance was granted for an unlimited period and funded 
through the Federal budget, i.e. by general taxation. This scheme was 
also implemented by the Federal Employment Agency, with recipients of 
unemployment assistance in principle having access to similar active la-
bour market schemes as UB I recipients.  
3. Social assistance (SA, Sozialhilfe), finally, provided basic income protec-
tion on a means-tested and flat-rate basis for all German inhabitants 
- with or without employment experience - who could not rely on suffi-
cient resources from earned income, other social benefits or family 
transfers. Thus, social assistance was the major protection system for 
unemployed with either no employment experience or unemployment 
insurance/unemployment assistance claims that did not match the 
guaranteed minimum income. Social assistance was funded by the mu-
nicipalities that were also responsible for reintegrating recipients into 
the labour market through specific active measures. 
In comparison to the unemployment assistance scheme, means-testing 
was harsher in the social assistance scheme, moreover, every job was 
considered acceptable. For labour market integration of employable social 
assistance recipients, a fairly rudimentary labour market policy, the “Help 
to Work” scheme, was available. It was operated by the municipalities 
with a considerable scope of discretion. There was no entitlement to inte-
gration measures by the Public Employment Service (PES).  
All systems had formal elements of activation and work requirement, but 
this was not enforced systematically in practice. For example, the „Help to 
Work Scheme“ (Hilfe zur Arbeit) incorporated in the Social Assistance Act 
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(§§ 18 to 20 BSHG) was based on the “rights and obligation” principle. 
The BSHG nevertheless failed to state specific provisions on the reason-
ability of job offers. Court rulings have tended to show that a protection of 
former occupational status no longer exists. Personal grounds are above 
all seen in age or sickness, while familial grounds mainly take account of a 
single parent’s care of a child under the age of three. Despite the fact that 
the law on social assistance called for individual efforts to search for work 
in order to be able to become independent from public assistance, activat-
ing interventions were not implemented systematically. Some local au-
thorities have been able to achieve remarkably good results in reintegrat-
ing assistance applicants under the “Help to Work” scheme. However, the 
intensity of activation differed strongly between municipalities, and many 
local authorities placed social assistance recipients in work opportunities 
that were covered by social insurance in order to create new entitlements 
to unemployment insurance benefits and unemployment benefits (Schnei-
der et al. 2002). This proved to be an effective way of shifting the burden 
of transfer payment to unemployment insurance. The fact that the two 
predecessor schemes of the current Unemployment Benefit II were sub-
ject to different rules and administered by different administrations posed 
the described problems that hampered efficient activation of recipients.  
Whereas the entitlement to unemployment benefits were extended in the 
mid 80s eligibility and suitability criteria in unemployment insurance, how-
ever, were tightened step by step over the nineties. The formal strictness 
of the unemployment protection regime was increased as legal provisions 
on benefits being conditional upon willingness to work and accept jobs not 
equivalent to prior qualification were reformulated in a more restrictive 
direction with occupational protection being revoked completely in 1997. 
The main motivation, however, was not effective activation, but short- 
term fiscal stabilization. At the same time, access to benefits became 
slightly more difficult, and benefit generosity was reduced marginally. 
Nevertheless, a rather “permissive” and benefit-cantered approach to un-
employment was still dominant in practical implementation. Moreover, al-
though evaluation studies in the nineties provided evidence that the ex-
tension of the length of entitlement in the 80s was associated with an in-
crease in unemployment duration, there was no change in entitlement pe-
riods in the nineties (Hunt 1995, Steiner 1997, Launov et al 2004). 
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2.3 The Hartz reforms 
With the number of recipients of UA and SA benefits steeply rising, largely 
due to a continuous increase in long-term unemployment, reforming these 
systems became a priority on the agenda of labour market and social pol-
icy. In the late nineties, the problem of fiscal disincentives was more 
widely discussed, thus paving the way to some pilot projects on joint ini-
tiatives of local PES and municipal social assistance offices to reintegrate 
the long-term unemployed into the labour market (“Mozart initiative”). 
This was followed by the JobAqtiv Act of late 2001 that aimed at a more 
coherent activation principle in Germany labour market policies for the 
first time. However, the moderate attempt of JobAqtiv was superposed by 
the PES placement scandal2 and the work of the Hartz commission, a gov-
ernment-initiated expert committee that present its report in August 
2002. This report formed the base for a package of reforms aiming at ac-
tivating both short- and long-term unemployed, reforming the PES and 
the institutional repertoire of active schemes. Finally, with the fourth Hartz 
Act (Hartz IV) coming into force in January 2005, unemployment assis-
tance and social assistance were replaced by a single means-tested re-
placement scheme for persons in need and able to work (UB II) not enti-
tled to unemployment insurance benefit or after expiry of this contribu-
tion-based benefit (UB I).  
Besides UB II, the new basic income scheme provides social allowance 
(Sozialgeld) to persons who live together with needy persons capable of 
working in a joint household (a so-called  Bedarfsgemeinschaft)3. The re-
cipients of social allowance are normally kids below the working age of 15 
                                                
2 In February 2002 the Federal Audit Court discovered that the placement statistics of 
the Federal Labour Office, the “Bundesanstalt für Arbeit”, were wrongly reported. As a 
result of this scandal the government presented a reform plan and set up an expert 
commission, named after its chairman, Peter Hartz, the human resource director of 
Volkswagen. 
3 The term Bedarfsgemeinschaft includes: the needy persons capable to work; the part-
ner living in the household, or the parent, respectively, of an under-age, unmarried 
employable child and this parent’s partner living in the household; the not perma-
nently separated spouse as partner of the employable person in need of assistance; 
the person living with the employable person in need of assistance as a cohabiting 
partner; the partner not permanently living apart from the employable person in need 
of assistance; the under-age unmarried children belonging to the household of the 
aforementioned persons to the extent that they are unable to procure their means of 
subsistence from their own income or assets. 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 6/2007   
 
11
years. Those incapable of work receive social assistance according to Book 
Twelve of the Social Code (SGB XII) which continues to be the responsibil-
ity of the municipalities (see table 1).  
Hartz IV radically changed the German system of wage-related welfare. 
The new Unemployment Benefit II scheme has a dual aim: on the one 
hand it was designed to prevent poverty but not to secure previous living 
standards. Thus, for those having received social assistance before, the 
new legislation actually allows them to receive marginally more money 
and access to job employment services. For former recipients of unem-
ployment assistance the level of transfer payment decreased. 
Table 1: The Old and the New Benefit System 
Old System (until 2004) New System (2005 -) 
Arbeitslosengeld (unemployment insur-
ance benefit): funded through contribu-
tions, earnings-related, limited duration 
Arbeitslosengeld I (UB I): funded through  
contributions, earnings-related, limited duration 
Arbeitslosenhilfe (earnings-related  
unemployment assistance): tax-funded, 
earnings-related, means-tested, infinite 
duration  
Grundsicherung (Basic income scheme for 
needy jobseeker/ SGB II)) 
Consisting of 
a) Arbeitslosengeld II (UB II): tax-funded, 
means-tested, flat rate, after expiry of UB I 
(and temporary supplement), infinite dura-
tion (integration of “Arbeitslosenhilfe” and 
“Sozialhilfe” for people capable of working ) 
but stronger principle of activation  
b) Sozialgeld (social allowance) for kids below 
the working age of 15 living in a household 
of an UB II recipient  
Sozialhilfe (social assistance): tax-
funded, means-tested, flat rate, infinite 
duration  
Social assistance: means-tested, tax-funded, 
flat rate, infinite duration (SGB XII) 
Consisting of 
▪ Grundsicherung für Erwerbsgeminderte und 
im Alter:  
for those working age people above 18 
years permanently  not capable of working 
and for needy persons above 65 years 
▪ Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt 
Help to overcome special situations in life 
(illness, care etc) 
 
Apart from its social policy objective, the aim of this reform was to lower 
unemployment but also to ease the burden of taxation and non-wage la-
bour costs by reducing benefit dependency. The major lever to achieve 
this goal was the shortening of individual unemployment spells through 
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accelerated job placement and more coherent activation of the beneficiar-
ies of unemployment insurance benefits and unemployment or social as-
sistance. Less generous benefits for long-term unemployed, stricter job 
suitability criteria and more effective job placement and active labour 
market schemes were the instruments to achieve this goal. However, as 
termination of need is the core objective, there is no formal labour market 
availability criterion. But benefit recipients can be demanded to take up 
any job and follow obligations stemming from integration agreements.  
For activation to become an effective answer to benefit dependency, the 
labour market, however, must improve its capacities to create jobs (Eich-
horst/Konle-Seidl 2007). Therefore part of the Hartz package was devoted 
to a (limited) flexibilization of the labour market (Jacobi/Kluve 2006, Eich-
horst/Kaiser 2006). This was not right at the core of activating labour 
market policy, but should facilitate it. 
The practical enforcement of “rights and duties”, however, is the core 
element of the Hartz reforms. The activation strategy is implemented in 
virtually every element of the labour market policy framework. The Hartz 
reforms shift priority towards active measures that require proactive be-
haviour of the unemployed and promote their direct integration into regu-
lar employment. To this end, the reform re-designed integration subsidies, 
introduced new forms of wage subsidies, start-up subsidies and jobs with 
reduced social security contributions. 
2.4 The political logic behind the policy shift 
Germany’s rather late, but broad and massive shift to activation or – more 
precisely – awakening of “sleeping” activating principles was the direct 
result of a long period of reform blockage and postponement in labour 
market policy. One explanation is German reunification. As a consequence 
of reunification in Germany, not the restructuring, but the expansion of 
traditional instruments of active labour market policies, particularly job 
creation schemes, but also passive income support was on the agenda in 
the beginning of the 1990s (Manow/Seils 2000). Another explication refers 
to the strong role of social partner self-administration in the Public Em-
ployment Service (Trampusch 2002) that were interested in controlling 
resource allocation to favour their clientele, take “surplus labour” out of 
the labour market and shift it to active and passive labour market policies 
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and other social benefit schemes while deficits in unemployment insurance 
were covered by the federal government or higher contributions.  
Although this resulted in rising non-wage labour costs which in turn ham-
pered employment creation. Despite the fact that rather critical evaluation 
studies on active labour market policies and employment disincentives in 
benefit systems, a more fundamental overhaul of active and passive la-
bour market policies was virtually a non-issue in the Germany political 
economy until the early years of the current decade. Reforms in this area 
would have questioned the implicit “social treatment” of unemployment 
and implied a more prominent role of low-wage employment as a tool of 
labour market re-entry for the long-term unemployed as well as a more 
general flexibilization of the labour market. 
The Red-Green coalition government that came into power in 1998 was 
divided on this issue, with the major fragmentation between different 
wings of the Social Democratic Party. On the one hand, the new govern-
ment revoked some of the restrictive provisions of the prior Christian-
Democratic/Liberal government and tried to stabilize the “social policy” 
approach to unemployment. On the other hand, it tried to develop a more 
coherent normative framework for labour market and welfare state re-
forms referring to the concept of the “activating state” which was mainly 
inspired by New Labour and “third way” approaches formulated in the 
United Kingdom (Giddens 1999).  
The concept of the “activating state” would have meant focusing public 
interventions on “enabling” programs that could help individuals take their 
own responsibility. In labour market policy, this implied stressing the con-
ditionality of benefits upon individual efforts and cooperation, thus em-
phasizing the fundamental symmetry of “rights and obligations”. As it 
would also mean a break with the tradition of a status-protecting and oc-
cupation-oriented welfare state, this concept met only limited acceptance 
and strong opposition from major fractions within the Social Democrats. 
Maybe the best example for this reluctance is the rejection of the alleged 
“neo-liberal” Schröder/Blair paper in 1999. Hence, activation could not be-
come a more systematic point of reference or an elaborated concept in the 
early years of the Red-Green coalition.  
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Reform stalemate could only be overcome in the face of the window of 
opportunity of the “placement scandal” and the subsequent Hartz report in 
2002 with an expert commission legitimizing further reforms of labour 
market policy and regulation, changing the role of social partner tripartism 
in BA and national policy-making, thus paving the way for more deter-
mined government action (Eichhorst/Kaiser 2006, Streeck/Trampusch 
2005). 
Activation was reintroduced by the report of the Hartz Commission who 
made references to good practices at the national levels, e.g. models of 
effective cooperation between BA and municipalities in selected “Mozart” 
projects, as well as international “best practices” and benchmarking of la-
bour market performance and policies. Hence, the Hartz reforms focus 
was inspired by activating policies for the unemployed in other European 
countries that were perceived to be more successful in lowering unem-
ployment such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands or Denmark (Brut-
tel/Kemmerling 2006, Eichhorst/Profit/Thode 2001, Fleckenstein 2004).  
The government’s willingness to implement the Hartz proposals in a com-
prehensive way implied further clarification of crucial issues such as the 
level of the unified benefit for long-term unemployed that was to replace 
unemployment assistance and social assistance for people capable of 
working (erwerbsfähig). With the “Agenda 2010” announced in March 
2003 in a situation of high and rising unemployment and considerable po-
litical pressure it became clear that the government would opt for a flat-
rate benefit with about the same level as social assistance thus effectively 
severing the link with prior earnings. This was to be implemented with the 
fourth Hartz Act (Hartz IV) in January 2005. In addition, the government 
announced shortening unemployment insurance benefit duration for older 
workers from 32 to 18 months and to cut dismissal protection and other 
elements of labour market regulation (Jantz 2004). 
This sequence of rather “harsh” reforms that were perceived as a break 
with traditional social policy approach to labour market problems provoked 
broad public unrest that eventually resulted in a significant decline in po-
litical support for the red-green coalition, in particular the Social Democ-
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rats, the emergence of a new left-wing party and the electoral defeat of 
Red-Green Coalition in autumn 2005 (Eichhorst/Sesselmeier 2006).4
The opposition was strongest in the Eastern part of Germany (Rucht/Yang 
2004). There, long-term unemployed people could rely on relatively high 
and unlimited payments of unemployment assistance due to widespread 
full-time employment of both men and women in the former GDR. Hence, 
abolishing earnings-related benefits, replacing them with flat-rate benefits 
and introducing a stricter activation policy was perceived as a threat to 
individual well being in particular given the poor labour market perspec-
tives in East Germany.  
Therefore, Hartz IV was perceived as a “social cruelty” that would result in 
severe benefit cuts, increasing poverty, strict supervision of jobseekers 
and forcing people in low-wage jobs, thus leading to a growing number of 
“working poor” and a tacit “Americanization” of the German labour mar-
ket, something that had to be avoided by any means in the past. Thus, 
Hartz IV became the symbol for a policy that was seen as a break with the 
principle of “the social insurance state” of providing status-oriented bene-
fits while imposing only limited demands on unemployed. 
Even to date, there is no societal consensus on policy objectives in labour 
market policies. Hence, the paradigm shift to activation is not complete 
yet. Moreover there is a dominating sense of injustice. It is fair to argue 
that the broad rejection of the Hartz IV-reform is due to a fundamental 
deficit of legitimating the “hidden” or silent shift from a social insurance 
state to a welfare state dominated by basic income support and stronger 
activation.  
                                                
4 This was also due to the fact that Hartz IV led to a change in unemployment statistics. 
The introduction of UB II implied new eligibility criteria for benefit receipt. One crite-
rion is that recipients have to be “capable of working at least three hours a day”. 
Moreover, the non-working partners of benefit claimants were obliged for the first 
time to register as unemployed. Therefore, a large number of former social assistance 
recipients, previously not registered as unemployed, were counted in January 2005 in 
the unemployment statistics. In turn, the number of registered unemployed exceeded 
5 million for the first time in Germany. Although this was only a statistical effect and 
did not mean a substantial increase in non-employment or broad unemployment, it 
was perceived as a major policy failure and the proof of the fact that the Hartz re-
forms did not work.  
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2.5 The Silent Change of the Welfare State Logic:  
From Bismarck to Beveridge? 
Despite on-going reforms since the mid-1990s, it is frequently argued that 
the Hartz IV law marks a critical juncture resulting in the departure from a 
conservative welfare state securing acquired standard of living and a 
move towards an Anglo-Saxon welfare state relying on means-tested wel-
fare and securing only basic needs. In fact, the Hartz IV reform is part of 
gradual shift from “Bismarck” to “Beveridge” in that it weakened the prin-
ciple of status protection and contribution-equivalence in unemployment 
benefits for the long-term unemployed and strengthened the role means-
tested flat-rate benefits providing a minimum income floor only. However, 
stricter means-testing and flat-rate benefits imply a higher degree of in-
terpersonal redistribution. Table 2 shows the relationship between recipi-
ents of contribution-based and means-tested flat-rate benefits in 2005.  
Table 2: Contribution-based and means-tested unemployment benefits (2005) 
Type of benefit Number of recipients In percent of working 
age population 
Insurance scheme (UB I) 1.730.000 3% 
Means-tested scheme 
(UB II) 
4.980.000 9% 
Total UB I and UB II 6.710.000 12% 
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit. 
 
To secure social status and the acquired standard of living, the unem-
ployment benefit and the previous unemployment assistance referred to 
the former income. The duration of the unemployment benefit varied 
strongly according to age. Until early 2006 drawing benefits for up to 32 
months was possible for older workers, thus stressing a widely perceived 
“savings account logic” of unemployment insurance. In the old system, a 
person becoming unemployed was entitled to unemployment insurance 
benefits for a certain period if he/she had an employment record of at 
least one year during the past few years. This benefit initially amounted to 
more than two thirds of the previous income with an in-build ceiling in ac-
cordance to the “equivalence principle”, and thus “rewarded” prior earn-
ings and effort. The higher an individual’s achievements during his or her 
employment career, the higher the benefits. Older workers with a longer 
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employment record could rely on extended unemployment insurance 
benefits. 
When unemployment benefits were exhausted, the unemployed could ap-
ply for unemployment assistance which was still related to previous earn-
ings but on a lower level. Although unemployment assistance was tax-
funded, it was seen as a prolongation of unemployment insurance benefit 
(Karl/Ullrich/Hamann 2002). The “equivalence principle” was comple-
mented by the principle of “occupational protection” that defined the “suit-
able job” an unemployed person had to accept as more or less adequate 
to the position held before becoming unemployed. Last but not least, per-
sons relying on unemployment insurance benefits could also benefit from 
heavy investment in “enabling” active labour market policy schemes. 
These programs were not primarily used as a work-test but as instru-
ments to stabilize human capital and restore benefit claims.  
Hence, removing occupational protection (as early as in 1997), but more 
specifically, shortening benefit duration in unemployment insurance for 
older workers and abolishing earnings-related unemployment assistance 
means a departure form status protection and the strong reliance on the 
insurance principle and the equivalence of contributions and benefits. 
Abolishing longer benefit durations for older unemployed and earnings-
related unemployment assistance was seen as an “expropriation”. As the 
reform interfered with widely accepted principles of “social justice” em-
bodied in an insurance-based system, this change was perceived as “un-
fair” in particular given the fear of increased economic pressure not only 
due to lower and less sufficient benefits but also due to the announcement 
of stricter activation and placement even in low-wage jobs. While such 
prospects are well established and generally accepted in countries like the 
United States or the UK, they mean an overhaul of established notions of 
the German social model which strongly rests on what could be called “so-
cial security citizenship” (Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2005)5. 
                                                
5  Moving from extended social insurance through earnings-related benefit both in un-
employment insurance and unemployment assistance also means a weakening of the 
traditional conservative “bread winner” model that was applied not only to the em-
ployed but also to the unemployed. The new basic income support does not take into 
account derived family responsibilities but generated individual entitlement for part-
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Labour market policies in Germany helped to create and sustain the illu-
sion that the “implicit contract” of rewarding previous contributions of the 
unemployed to the German economy – through benefits and labour mar-
ket measures – was still intact. In fact, this contract had been undermined 
to a considerable degree for an increasing number of long-term unem-
ployed who, in addition to their often meagre Arbeitslosenhilfe, had to rely 
on Sozialhilfe payments, thus receiving financial support that was only re-
lated to “need” and not to previous labour market achievement. 
3 Activating Labour Market Policy Today  
3.1 The general framework  
The first and foremost objective of activating labour market policy in Ger-
many is the reduction of individual unemployment duration by bringing 
unemployed persons, in particularly the long-term unemployed, back to 
work.  
The basic principle of activating labour market policy in Germany is 
“Fördern und Fordern“, i.e. enabling or supporting the jobseekers on the 
one hand and demanding individual effort on the other. The recent re-
forms are in fact a recalibration of the Janus-faced nature of the German 
welfare state emphasizing both the role of demanding provisions (For-
dern) and the enabling or empowering elements of social and labour mar-
ket policy (Fördern). While these principles have been in place for some 
time under former social assistance and in the well established active la-
bour market policy framework, what is new is a tighter conceptual and 
practical linking of promoting and demanding elements (Fördern durch 
Fordern). These general orientations were explicitly fixed in the new SGB 
II (Second Book of the German Social Security Act, Sozialgesetzbuch II).  
The concept of individual “co-production” for needy persons “capable of 
work” replaces the former paternalistic model. As participation in the la-
bour market is assumed to be the high road to societal integration, taking 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
ners/spouses and children, thus furthering individualization of welfare claims and 
stressing job search requirements for all employable members of a needy household 
and breaking with a more conservative family model (Knuth 2006).  
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up work is superior to receiving passive benefits only. Formal terms defin-
ing the basic orientation of German activating labour market policy, how-
ever, open up ample space for divergent interpretations that are crucial 
for actual implementation.  
Complementary to activating instruments in a more narrow sense, SGB II 
comprises enabling schemes such as labour market policy programs (§ 16 
(1) SGB II) and other social services like child care provision or help in 
case of social problems like drug abuse, debt or housing (§ 16 (2) SGB II) 
that have been conceived in order to facilitate labour market integration of 
employable benefit recipients, but do not reinforce benefit conditionality.  
3.2 Target Groups  
Activating measures address foremost the target group of unemployed 
persons – both UB I and UB II recipients. To avoid long-term unemploy-
ment, which begins after 12 months according to both the German and 
the European definition, these persons have to register promptly with the 
local employment offices as soon as unemployment is foreseeable.  
The medical definition of “capability to work” (not employability) with 
three hours a day in the foreseeable future under the usual conditions of 
the labour market results in a rather broad demarcation of the target 
groups which exceeds the focus of activation in many other European 
countries. This contributes to higher figures of open (registered) unem-
ployment while in other countries a narrow definition of employability 
means fewer people registered as unemployed but assigned to passive 
schemes such as disability benefits.  
The “capability of working” (Erwerbsfähigkeit) features prominently as the 
overall concept of this approach. The individual working ability is evalu-
ated purely from a medical standpoint. It is decided by the institution re-
sponsible for the safety net, i.e. usually the local employment office.  
Certain sub-groups of persons “capable of working” are exempted from 
the availability criterion under the unemployment insurance regime (UB 
I), and the conditional job search requirement under basic income support 
(UB II). This holds for sick people and for persons that care for children 
less than 3 years old or care for family members as well as for older per-
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sons (so called 58er-Regelung). However, there is a contradictory ap-
proach regarding to older persons with some enabling schemes on the one 
hand (wage subsidies and wage insurance) and the clause exempting 
them from the obligation to be available for work. Accordingly, these per-
sons receive public support but are not obliged to seek or accept employ-
ment - nor are they recorded as unemployed in the statistics (Eichhorst 
2006).  
Persons with disabilities form an additional group at the core of the legis-
lator’s activating strategy. These persons are not subject to the same re-
quirements as other unemployed persons, in particular their rights to sup-
port are less tightly linked to duties. The prime objective since many 
years, however, is to promote participation in working life. The principle of 
supporting rehabilitation measures instead of paying passive income sup-
port for disabled people is a basic feature of German active labour market 
policy. Furthermore, access to passive schemes like disability allowance is 
rather restrictive and not seen as an attractive “escape route” like in most 
other European countries (Konle-Seidl/Lang 2006).6
3.3 Demanding and promoting under SGB III  
(unemployment insurance)  
The role of demanding and promoting elements (Fördern und Fordern) dif-
fer with respect to individual rights and obligations between unemploy-
ment insurance (Third Book of the Social Security Act, SGB III) and basic 
income support (Second Book of the Social Security Act, SGB II).  
The claim to unemployment benefit under § 118(1) SGB III arises in the 
event of unemployment and further vocational training. Workers entitled 
to unemployment benefit must be unemployed and registered with the 
employment office and must have fulfilled the qualifying period. 
Unemployed persons pursuant to § 119(1) SGB III are persons without 
work, seek to end their unemployment (personal efforts) and are available 
                                                
6  This means that the share of recipients registered as unemployed and included in 
mandatory job search activities or activation programs is higher in Germany (12,1 
percent of working age population) and that of “inactive” recipients of passive insur-
ance and welfare benefit schemes (3,5 percent of working age population) lower than 
in other countries. 
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for the placement efforts of the Employment Agency (availability). Persons 
are considered to be without work if they do not work at all or if they work 
less than 15 hours per week. To be available, the unemployed person 
must be capable of work and be prepared to work, i.e. have the subjective 
will to work. 
An important aspect of job-seeking is that unemployed persons only have 
to accept and search for work that can be reasonably expected of them 
(§§ 119(5) no. 1, 121 SGB III). The extent of this restriction on the seek-
ing of reasonable work is largely influenced by the courts, which interpret 
it on the basis of particular case decisions. 
The amount of unemployment benefit is regulated in § 129 SGB III and 
depends on family status, wage-tax bracket and weekly remuneration. Ac-
cordingly, insured persons with at least one child are entitled to 67 per-
cent or, without children, to 60 percent of net remuneration fixed as a 
lump sum. Unemployment insurance claims are based on an employment 
record and provide for benefits proportional to prior earnings in the refer-
ence period. It does not take individual means or need into account.  
Unemployed persons must through their own personal efforts utilise all 
possibilities available for their occupational integration (§ 119 (4) SGB 
III). These efforts include the performance of duties set forth in the inte-
gration agreement, participation in third-party placement services and the 
use of self-information facilities provided by the Employment Agencies. 
The concept of personal effort bears activating features in that the search 
for employment is a precondition for the receipt of unemployment benefit. 
The nearest sanction for lack of personal effort is the imposition of a dis-
qualification period. Unemployed are deemed available for the placement 
efforts if, inter alia, they are capable of and allowed to exercise an occu-
pation which can be reasonably expected of them under the usual condi-
tions of the labour market to be considered by them, and which is subject 
to compulsory insurance and comprises a weekly working time of no less 
than 15 hours. An important criterion of this definition is “suitability”, 
which is detailed in § 121 SGB III and purports that an unemployed per-
son can be expected to perform all occupations conforming to his or her 
working capabilities to the extent that general or personal grounds do not 
oppose the reasonability of an employment. 
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However, in contrast to basic income protection, not all jobs are consid-
ered suitable for unemployment insurance beneficiaries. There is not only 
a minimum threshold of 15 hours per week, but also a minimum level of 
earnings to be achieved that is related to prior wages and to the benefit 
levels. In earlier times, the protection of an acquired earnings level and 
occupation was even stronger. But the principle of occupational protection 
had been eroded to a considerable degree in 1997 when new legislation 
stipulated that after six months of unemployment any job was suitable 
that provides at least earnings equivalent to unemployment compensa-
tion.  
Nevertheless, until 1998 it was possible to stabilize and renew claims for 
unemployment insurance benefits through participation in publicly funded 
training programs and until 2003 in direct public job creation. These pos-
sibilities are cut now and additionally the Hartz legislation strengthened 
availability criteria by defining removal reasonable and just in case of sin-
gle unemployed and by shifting the burden of proof in case of rejection of 
job offers to the unemployed. Last but not least, the cut in maximum 
benefit duration for unemployed  under 54 years from maximum 26 
months to 12 months and from 32 to 18 months for unemployed aged 55 
and over (effective since 1 February 2006) and to means that older un-
employed move to means-tested basic income support earlier in their un-
employment spell.  
3.4 Demanding and promoting principles under SGB II 
(Basic Income Scheme) 
Basic income support for needy jobseekers (Grundsicherung für Ar-
beitsuchende) has the double aim of  
a) providing sufficient minimum resources to ensure a decent standard 
of living in order to avoid poverty and 
b) Ending benefit dependency through reintegration into gainful em-
ployment.  
Basic income support for jobseekers is awarded under § 7 SGB II to per-
sons who have attained the age of 15 but are still under 65, are capable of 
gainful employment, in need of assistance and have their customary place 
of abode in the Federal Republic of Germany.  
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According to § 1 Abs. 1 SGB II “people capable of working” should over-
come need through their own efforts and their own means. An individual is 
needy if he/she is unable to earn a living for him/her and for the other 
family members living together in one household. The individual in ques-
tion is required to take on an acceptable job and use his own income and 
(certain) assets as well as that of his/her partner. Legislation on basic in-
come support (SGB II) pursues foremost social objectives. It provides a 
needs-oriented income so that all needy persons in Germany have suffi-
cient means of subsistence.  
Although basic income support for needy jobseekers is foremost a genuine 
social policy program to avoid poverty it has a strong focus on the labour 
market. With Hartz IV the interface of social and labour market policy has 
been redefined and the traditional divide between both policy areas 
eroded. It focuses on need (not on unemployment as such) and on inter-
ventions to reduce need – with attempts at labour market integration fea-
turing prominently as a promising way to end benefit dependency.  
Thus, the new regime of basic income points at personal responsibility and 
at enabling and supporting interventions in order to enhance individual 
capacities to overcome need. Labour market availability and willingness to 
take up any job – even below wages set by collective agreements or pub-
lic employment opportunities - are therefore crucial elements of activation 
addressing recipients of basic income support as long as they are capable 
of work. At the same time, however, UB II recipients can keep their bene-
fit if they take up low-wage jobs that fit into the earnings disregard 
clause. The current provision stipulated that the first EUR 100 of monthly 
earnings are not taken into account when benefits are calculated whereas 
between EUR 100 and 800 20% remain with the beneficiaries as is true for 
10% of earnings between EUR 800 and EUR 1.200 for singles or EUR 
1.500 in case of UB II recipients with children.  
Pursuant to § 19 SGB II, UB II consists of benefits to secure subsistence, 
including reasonable costs of accommodation and heating, and a fixed-
term supplementary allowance under § 24 SGB II, which is to cushion the 
transition from unemployment assistance to Unemployment Benefit II. It’s 
an additional benefit that provides two thirds of the difference between 
UB I and UB II for twelve months and one third for an additional year.  
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The normal benefit under § 20(2) and (4) SGB II is a lump-sum amount 
that is supposed to cover all living expenses. From 1 July 2006, this 
amount has been fixed at a standard rate of EUR 345 throughout the fed-
eral territory. Benefits for accommodation and heating are specified in 
§ 22 SGB II. Their amount is equivalent to the actual expenses, provided 
these are reasonable. 
This standard payment is higher than the social assistance benefit (EUR 
295 since July 2004). For children the standard payments are lower. Nev-
ertheless SA benefits included more additional payments than UB II. In 
comparison to former unemployment assistance (on average EUR 550 in 
2003 in Western Germany) UB II is less generous. This should result in 
pressure on the jobless to take on work. However, it should to be taken 
into account that, whereas the recipients of UB II receive payments for 
housing and heating, the former UA recipients could only qualify for sup-
plementary housing and social assistance if they fulfilled special condi-
tions.  
Hence, contrary to widespread beliefs, the new UB II is not in general 
lower than means-tested benefits prior to the Hartz IV reform. This holds 
for virtually all former social assistance beneficiaries, but also for a rele-
vant share of all former unemployment assistance recipients. Simulation 
studies show that about one sixth of them lost its benefit entitlement due 
to the stricter consideration of wealth or earned income. Of the remaining 
persons with continued benefit claims, about 47 percent receive higher 
benefits, and about 53 percent have net losses (Blos/Rudolph 2005). For-
mer unemployment assistance beneficiaries are affected unequally, how-
ever, with net gains concentrated among the young and the lone parents 
while older beneficiaries and couples with relatively high benefits under 
earnings-related unemployment assistance suffered from considerable 
cuts. This is mainly true for East Germany (65% losers) where long-term 
unemployed with a substantial employment record in the GDR and subse-
quent receipt of higher unemployment assistance are now transferred to 
flat-rate UB II (Becker/Hauser 2006, Blos/Rudolph 2005, see figures 1 and 
2). 
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Figure 1:  Change in Benefit Levels due to Hartz IV Reform, Former  
Unemployment Assistance Recipients, by Household Type 
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Figure 2:  Change in Benefit Levels due to Hartz IV Reform, Former  
Unemployment Assistance Recipients, by Age Group 
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Basic income can also be received in all cases of need where resources 
from work and other income are not sufficient to pass the threshold in-
come set by law. Hence, basic income support does not only focus on reg-
istered unemployed without entitlements to unemployment insurance 
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benefits, but also on people in school and training or in dependent em-
ployment if they pass the means-test. The same holds for self-employed. 
In contrast to former social assistance, UB II recipients are covered by 
both statutory health insurance and old-age pension insurance which also 
means that self-employed can receive health insurance coverage at a low 
premium under UB II.  
Although the legislator defined the prerequisite for UB II receipt - capabil-
ity of working - in a legally unequivocal manner, two problematic issues 
have been quick to emerge: For one thing, unequivocal assignment is not 
a question of law; rather, whether a person can work for at least three 
hours daily is a factual problem that is certain to raise dispute. The term 
“capable of working” is a criterion of delimitation vis-à-vis social assis-
tance, since only persons capable of gainful employment can be expected 
to earn their living consistently and primarily through their own work. 
Consequently, there is a need for the various benefit institutions to reach 
a uniform decision on this issue. The essential aim of consistently placing 
persons able to work for at least three hours a day and also members of 
their Bedarfsgemeinschaft under a single regime (either SGB II or SGB 
XII) has been judicially confirmed, and the relevant decisions have found 
approval in the literature (SG (Social Court) Oldenburg, ruling of 10 Jan. 
2005 - S 2 SO 3/05 ER, annotated by Berlit (2005); SG Oldenburg, ruling 
of 18 Jan. 2005 - S 46 AS 24/05 ER, annotated by Luthe (2005).  
In January 2005, more than 90 percent of former social assistance have 
been assessed as “capable of working” and consequently transferred from 
municipal responsibility to the new basic income support scheme financed 
out of taxes at the Federal level.  However, first analyses by the BA re-
garding the structure of long-term unemployed recipients of UB II show 
that about half of all UB II beneficiaries have a considerable distance to 
the labour market. This holds in particular for long-term unemployed with-
out vocational training, over 50 years of age, with severe health problems 
or a migration background especially in regions with high unemployment. 
About 400.000 to 600.000 people assessed as capable of working obvi-
ously have severe barriers to labour market integration.  
Eligibility criteria are detailed in § 10 SGB II and regulate what kind of 
work jobseekers can reject without risking curtailment of UB II. In princi-
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ple, the person capable of working, but in need of assistance can reasona-
bly be expected to accept any kind of work. Nevertheless, there are ex-
emptions designed to ensure the regulation’s due conformity with basic 
rights. Thus a job is unreasonable if the jobseeker is mentally or emotion-
ally not in a position to perform the specific work, or if performance of the 
work would substantially impede the future pursuit of his or her previous 
vocation. Moreover, priority is given to the raising of the jobseeker’s own 
child or the partner’s child. The care of a child who has reached the age of 
three is, as a rule, ensured in a day-care facility or in some other way, 
and is thus to be worked towards by the competent local authorities. The 
same applies to the care of dependants. Besides that, an omnibus clause 
comes to bear if some other important ground prevents the performance 
of the work in question. 
The construct of the eligibility rule is important for understanding the new 
concept of placing demands on the recipients of basic security for job-
seekers. Other than in the case of unemployment assistance, this regula-
tion has deliberately been decoupled from the eligibility criteria under 
§ 121 SGB III. The legislator justifies this by pointing out that demands on 
basic security recipients must be more stringent than those adopted in the 
insurance system because the burden on the general public resulting from 
the neediness of individual persons must be kept as low as possible. 
In sum, the grounds of unreasonable hardship under § 10 SGB II are 
much more narrowly defined than those under the Third Book of the So-
cial Code (SGB III) and, in part, have even been tightened vis-à-vis ante-
cedent regulations on social assistance. At present, there is no evidence to 
suggest that established administrative practice or court rulings under-
mine the activating function of strict eligibility rules. 
3.5 The Personal Integration Agreement  
The results from an individual profiling process at the employment offices 
are set out in a binding integration agreement. This written agreement 
states both the services that will be provided to the job seeker as well as 
the job seeker’s obligation regarding job search activities and programme 
participation, where required. An unemployed individual will be threatened 
by sanctions if he or she deviates from the integration agreement or does 
not cooperate appropriately.  
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Integration agreements pursuant to § 35(4) SGB III for UB I recipients are 
not a precondition for participating in active measures. Rather they are 
regarded as an instrument for improving the placement procedure. Under 
the insurance scheme integration agreements have a limited significance. 
They are linked only to active measures, but not to passive benefit re-
ceipt. The agreement therefore cannot be used to sanction unemployed 
persons. As a consequence, integration agreements are scarcely applied 
within the legal ambit of SGB III. The agreement’s mere restriction to the 
acquisition of more comprehensive information for the unilateral decision 
on active employment promotion measures fails to do adequate justice to 
the potential inherent in agreed strategies. In contrast to integration 
agreements for UB II claimants, the merits of negotiated strategies under 
the insurance scheme mainly lie in the psychological sphere. 
In contrast to the insurance scheme personal agreements for UB II claim-
ants are mandatory pursuant to §§ 2(1) sent. 2 and 15 SGB II. The two 
parts have to conclude an integration agreement stipulating the necessary 
services and obligations. This duty is not a duty in the legal sense, but a 
so-called incidental obligation, meaning its fulfilment is not legally en-
forceable. But it is indirectly “compelled” via the imposition of a financial 
sanction.  Jobseekers face financial disadvantages if they refuse to enter 
into an integration agreement (§ 31(1) SGB II).  
3.6 Sanctions 
According to § 144 SGB III benefit receipt could be suspended temporarily 
if a UB I recipient  
• refuses suitable work or a suitable activation measure  
• resigns work without good reason or 
• shows insufficient effort to look for a new job  
• Fails to notify in the case of dismissal to the employment office.  
The sanction consists in the imposition of a disqualification period of nor-
mally 12 weeks. 
A key element has been introduced through a reversal of the onus of proof 
in respect of the “good reason” which can justify a disqualification period. 
Now it is the unemployed person who must prove the facts within his or 
her sphere of activity and scope of responsibility – and not the administra-
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tive authority, who only bears the burden of proof under the general rules 
of evidence. 
In contrast to unemployment insurance, however, basic income support 
(UB II) cannot be suspended completely in case of lack of willingness to 
work or to participate in reintegration programs, but only reduced to a 
certain extent as minimum resources needed for physical existence cannot 
be withdrawn even if the behaviour of the recipient violates general prin-
ciples of activation. In extreme cases, benefits in kind can replace cash 
benefits.  
The sanction regulation under § 31(1) sent. 1 no. 1c SGB II implies that 
the duty to take up reasonable work is not a legal duty, but a mere inci-
dental obligation. This is because the regulation makes clear that work 
need not actually be taken up for the receipt of benefits under SGB II, but 
that the refusal to accept reasonable work only has financial consequences 
for the jobseeker. The subsequent provisions of § 31 SGB II moreover do 
not entail a complete denial of all benefits under SGB II in case of the 
beneficiary’s persisting unwillingness to work, but instead specify the 
sanctions to be adopted. 
The possible curtailment of UB II and its ultimate withdrawal as provided 
under § 31 SGB II, constitute important enforcement measures. UB II re-
cipients are obliged to accept any offer to suitable work. The definition of 
suitable work was broadened. Both the beneficiary’s refusal to conclude an 
integration agreement and his or her non-compliance with agreed duties, 
but also the rejection of a reasonable job offer, an immediate offer or a 
public employment opportunity without a valid reason lead to a 30 percent 
reduction of benefits (standard rate) upon first breach of duty. A second 
breach of duty incurs a 60 percent reduction, followed by the complete 
withdrawal of benefit if a renewed breach occurs within a year. To ensure 
the constitutionally guaranteed subsistence minimum, the provision of in-
kind benefits is left to the duty-bound discretion of the institution granting 
basic security – § 31(3) SGB II (Wunder/Diehm 2006). These refined 
sanctioning provisions addressing UB II claimants are a result of legal 
fine-tuning effective as of August 2006 or January 2007 after an unex-
pected increase in numbers of beneficiaries. This also led to stricter sanc-
tioning clauses for beneficiaries under 25 that stipulated that after the first 
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incidence of misconduct, benefits can be restricted to benefits in kind. 
However, the duration of sanctions can be reduced from 12 to 6 weeks. 
3.7 Activation Measures for UB I recipients 
Active employment promotion include a variety of measures stipulated 
under § 3(1) SGB III. Examples of active employment measures are: 
counselling and career guidance, job placement, job creation schemes, 
wage subsidies, training measures to improve integration prospects, and 
the defrayal of retraining costs during participation in further vocational 
training. 
In the early days of labour market policies, as expressed in the Federal 
Employment Promotion Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz) of 1969, not only 
the unemployed but also persons with insufficient training were entitled to 
long-range training measures, receiving generous support during these 
measures and even for six months afterwards if they did not immediately 
find a job. Thus, active labour market policies offered possibilities of up-
grading the labour force, both to the benefit of the individual (upwards 
mobility) and the collective (maintaining a well-trained labour force). Soon 
after the first labour market crisis in the mid-1970s, the entitlements of 
the individuals to training measures – and to the accompanying pay-
ments- were severely curtailed.  
With the Hartz reforms a number of new instruments were created that 
aim at a more effective re-integration of the unemployed although they 
are not “activating” in a narrow sense, i.e. used to enforce benefit condi-
tionality. These innovative instruments comprise different forms of flexible 
and subsidized employment apart from “classical” employer-oriented wage 
subsidies:  
1. temporary agency work for the unemployment provided by specific 
agencies associated with the PES (Personal-Service-Agenturen), 
2. part-time work up to EUR 400 per month exempt from employees’ con-
tributions to social insurance and taxes (Minijobs) replacing older mod-
els of minor employment (geringfügige Beschäftigung) with a lower 
earnings threshold, 
3. jobs between EUR 400 and 800 per month with employees’ social in-
surance contributions increasing proportionally with earnings (Midi-
jobs), 
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4. start-up grants for small business providing subsidies for up to three 
years (Ich-AG or “Me Inc.”). 
Additionally, preventive measures like “job-to-job placement” have been 
enforced. Pursuant to § 37b SGB III, persons whose employment or train-
ing relationship is due to end are obliged to report personally as job-
seekers to the local employment office no later than three months prior to 
the termination of that relationship. Non-compliance with this reporting 
obligation entails a disqualification period of one week. It is hoped that 
early reporting will permit the Employment Agencies to become active 
faster and thus more successfully, than in the past. The financial loss set 
by law for late reporting has met opposition and has therefore become a 
matter for the courts.7 In the last instance, the Federal Social Court 
(Bundessozialgericht) came to the conclusion that unemployment insur-
ance benefits could only be reduced on account of belated reporting if the 
jobseeker was to blame for this.  
3.8 Activation Measures for UB II recipients  
The provision of services is based on individual need for assistance. UB II 
recipients are no longer excluded from most of the instruments of ALMP 
provided by SGB III. The implementing institutions (Arbeitsgemeinschaf-
ten, ARGEn, or Optionskommunen, municipalities) are in principle entitled, 
as set forth in § 16(1) SGB II, to apply all the instruments available for 
UB I recipients by reference to the relevant provisions of SGB III. More-
over, SGB II has introduced additional measures which have been de-
signed specifically for welfare recipients and their particular barriers to 
employment like debt, abuse of alcohol or other drugs, socio-psychological 
counselling and child care services stipulated in  § 16(2) SGB II or a start-
up allowance pursuant to § 29 SGB II. The promotion of re-integration 
measures is regulated in § 14 SGB II, meaning the institutions responsible 
for providing basic security to jobseekers primarily become active with the 
aim of reintegrating needy persons capable of working into the labour 
market. 
                                                
7  Despite the meanwhile mitigated version of the sanction regulation, court rulings  
remain relevant: BSG (Federal Social Court), judgment of 25 May 2005, SGB 2006, 
49 ff.; BSG, judgment of 18 Aug. 2005.  
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In a recent amendment by 20 July 2006, § 15a SGB II now provides that 
persons capable of working who within the past two years have not re-
ceived cash benefits under either SGB II or SGB III are immediately to be 
offered benefits for integration into work upon applying for benefits pursu-
ant to SGB II. This “immediate offer” of integration services is to avoid the 
need of assistance or at least prevent long spells of such need and to test 
the applicant’s readiness to accept employment. 
If needy persons capable of working find no job, public employment op-
portunities are to be created on their behalf (§ 16(3) SGB II). Prerequi-
sites governing the admissibility of job opportunities are not to be dis-
cussed further here. Important, rather, is how the legislator’s conceptions 
are put into practice.  
The legislative intent was that the provision of time-limited job opportuni-
ties (so-called “One-Euro-Jobs”) would avoid the emergence of a subsi-
dized, state-financed “third” labour market, as was the case with the 
largely unsuccessful public job creation measures in the 1990s. Activation 
programs should be applied only if they avoid, eliminate, shorten or re-
duce benefit dependency through integration into a regular job.  
Integration benefits come under the reservation of § 3 SGB II, which per-
mits them only if they are required to avoid or eliminate, shorten or re-
duce the need of assistance for integration (into the primary labour mar-
ket). The activating effect of job opportunities is seen in re-accustoming 
jobless persons to activities with a steady work rhythm, punctuality, and 
so forth, and, hence, to improve their integration prospects (“work-
pedagogic objective”) (Bieritz-Harder 2005). The foremost aim is always 
to achieve integration into the regular labour market, possibly also to re-
gain fully-fledged employment in the wake of such job opportunities. The 
approach of regarding these additional jobs as a quid pro quo for the re-
ceipt of Unemployment Benefit II does not conform to the enacted text, 
nor can this be inferred from the judgments so far delivered in respect of 
§ 16(3) SGB II. 
4 Constitutional Constraints to Activation  
From a legal point of view there are three problem areas concerning acti-
vation policy. The one involves the “constitutional guarantee of a subsis-
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tence minimum”. The second problem concerns the “constitutional guar-
antee of property” concerning insurance benefit claims and the third one 
“workfare” (public work) as a possible infringement of the “constitutional 
guarantee of occupational freedom”. 
4.1 Constitutional Guarantee of a Subsistence Minimum 
Basic income support refers to Art. 1. (1) GG Abs. 1 on “human dignity” 
and to the “social state principle” (Sozialstaatsprinzip) of Germany as men-
tioned in Art. 20(1) GG and Art. 28(1) GG. In contrast to other constitu-
tions in Europe, the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG) does not pro-
claim fundamental social rights, nor does it lay down programmatic social 
guidelines. The “social state principle”, however, comprises duties and 
mandates for state action only when legal, political and/or societal reality 
diverges on too great a scale from constitutional objectives.  
The “constitutional guarantee of a subsistence minimum” seems to be the 
lynchpin for the admissibility of employment promotion benefits and for 
the provision of basic security to jobseekers or, alternatively, for the pos-
sibility of reducing these benefits as a sanction.  
To date, the Federal Constitutional Court as court of last instance has de-
livered no decision on the interpretation of the Basic Law in this question. 
Yet a number of its decisions seem to imply that the right to human dig-
nity in conjunction with the social state principle establishes a positive 
duty of the state to secure minimum conditions for a life worthy of human 
beings, thus correlating with a negative duty to prevent state intervention 
in the subsistence minimum. 
Originally, this duty took the form of police measures on behalf of indigent 
persons, notably to avoid any breach of the peace (Zacher 2004). In the 
1970s, the Federal Constitutional Court finally acknowledged the duty of 
the state to secure “minimum conditions for a dignified existence” 
(BVerfGE 40, 121 (133); 45, 187 (228). However, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court made clear that the stipulation of an amount in figures repre-
senting the positive duty of the legislator to deliver benefits could not be 
inferred from the constitution. Consequently, the Federal Social Court 
ruled on 23 November 2006 that the level of UB II conforms with constitu-
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tional requirements as parliament has ample room to define a concrete 
monetary amount (BSG Judgment, AZ B 11b AS 1/06 R).  
Hence, neither the state guarantees regarding “human dignity” nor the 
“social state principle” provide the basis for a definition of the level of ba-
sic income support as a minimum level of resources (soziokulturelles Exis-
tenzminimum) needed in order to safeguard existence and participation in 
society It is the responsibility of parliament to define this standard in ac-
cordance with constitutional principles. This refers to the principle of „de-
manding“ (Fordern) stipulated in § 2 SGB II. Need for help is defined in 
§ 9 SGB II and is only given if life cannot be sustained by individual effort 
and resources, in particular if there is not sufficient income from suitable 
jobs. 
Not to be forgotten in the discourse over the “amount of subsistence 
minimum” is the fact that assistance-induced social stigmatisation and so-
cial exclusion against the background of hidden poverty can weigh more 
heavily than any increase in financial assistance granted. Precisely the as-
pect that a dignified life without work can be financed through state sup-
port, but that the aim of helping people to help themselves might then be 
neglected, should be included in the further discussion on activating 
measures. 
As the social state principle also implies the concept of the social state 
founded on the basic rights of freedom (freiheitlicher Sozialstaat) the state 
holds no “monopoly on social affairs”. Hence, the social state principle 
epitomises the “basic formula of self-responsibility”, which also underlies 
all activating measures of employment promotion.  
4.2 The Property Guarantee  
Claims to unemployment benefit are protected against interventions in 
existing positions through the guarantee of property (BVerfGE 72, 9 ff.; 
74, 9 ff.; 74, 203 ff.; 92, 365 ff., see also Papier (2003)). Concerned are 
claims which have been acquired through employee and employer contri-
butions and which serve to secure existence on account of their function 
as wage replacement benefits. Amendments of law are thus admissible 
either if they leave vested legal positions unaffected, i.e. apply only to the 
future, or if they are cushioned with the help of transitional provisions. 
The legislator must submit grounds to legitimate any intervention.  
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Moreover, positions protected as property rights can be modified by way 
of admissible provisions governing their content and limits – Art 14(1) 
sent. 2 GG. This means in particular, grounds of public interest with due 
regard for the principle of proportionality can justify an intervention in a 
safeguarded position. Regarding the cut in maximum benefit duration of 
UB I from 32 to 18 months for older workers, conformity to constitutional 
requirements is safeguarded as a sufficient transition period between legal 
changes in 2003 and effective application on newly unemployed in early 
2006 elapsed. Cuts in benefit duration in unemployment insurance are 
possible to the extent that the principle of protection of confidence for a 
limited period of time for both the insured and the current beneficiaries is 
observed.  
From these arguments it may be inferred that basic security benefits do 
not come under the property guarantee of Art. 14 GG. They are not based 
on substantial personal contributions because they are granted from tax 
revenues in the form of welfare benefits, irrespective of any previously 
paid contributions. This was confirmed by the most recent judgment of the 
Federal Social Court. It was made clear that earnings-related unemploy-
ment assistance could be replaced by flat-rate UB II. As both benefits are 
means-tested and tax-funded, the property guarantee of social insurance 
does not apply.  
4.3 Constitutional Guarantee of Free Choice of  
Occupation  
Regarding activating labour market policies, one might raise the question 
whether demanding participation in community work (“workfare”) is feasi-
ble given the constitutional requirements.  
Under Art. 12(1) GG, all Germans have the right to freely choose their oc-
cupation or profession, their place of work, and their place of training. Im-
portant here is that Art. 12(1) GG is a purely defensive right, and not a 
right to any financial security on behalf of negative occupational freedom. 
Persons who freely decide never to work enjoy the constitutional protec-
tion of this freedom, but are not entitled to demand money from the state 
to enable them to live a life without working. This means that the linking 
of state financial assistance in the event of unemployment to the basic 
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willingness to accept reasonable employment is not inherently an in-
fringement of Art. 12(1) GG.  
Also to be noted in this connection is Art. 12(2) GG, whereby no one may 
be required to perform work of a particular kind except within the frame-
work of a traditional duty of community service that applies generally and 
equally to all. Moreover, forced labour may be imposed only on persons 
deprived of their liberty by a court judgment (Art. 12(3) GG). To date, en-
croachments on these rights through SGB III and SGB II regulations have 
been denied on the grounds that, in light of the historical origin of this 
provision, only forced labour in the sense of a direct coercive measure is 
prohibited. Measures with an (indirect) coercive character, such as the 
suspension, reduction or stop of financial benefits upon rejection of a rea-
sonable employment offer, are not open to question as long as the secu-
rity system of social assistance ensures that the essential means of sub-
sistence are guaranteed (Gagel 2005).  
The subject matter of judicial decisions was whether the proposition of a 
job opportunity constitutes an administrative act and, hence, can be 
deemed an independent regulation that could be contested by jobseekers 
through a protest procedure and subsequent legal action. The decisions 
rendered to date have denied these effects of the proposition. The courts 
have in this way conceded greater leeway to the Employment Agencies, 
instructing jobseekers to first await a sanction notice, which will only be 
issued if they refuse to accept the proposed job opportunity. Only follow-
ing this notice must the legality of the proposition be reviewed on the ba-
sis of the prerequisites set out in § 16(3) SGB II SG (Social Court) Ham-
burg, ruling of 7 June 2005 - S 62 AS 434/05 ER; SG Berlin, ruling of 18 
July 2005 - S 37 AS 4801/05 ER). 
In general, the provisions of SGB II regarding the obligation to accept a 
One Euro Job if integration into the regular labour market is not possible 
in the foreseeable future do not contradict the principle of free choice of 
occupation or profession The main objective of this intervention is not 
forced labour but helping benefit recipients reenter (or at least prepare 
them for) the labour market so that need can be terminated (Sachver-
ständigenrat 2006).  
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A possible infringement of contractual freedom protected under Art. 2(1) 
GG could be derived by the duty to conclude a personal integration 
agreement. However, the conclusion of the agreement is only indirectly 
“compelled” via the imposition of a financial sanction, so that there is no 
direct obligation to contract and no direct intervention in the jobseeker’s 
contractual freedom. Court decisions delivered to date have been geared 
to the lack of a direct coercive measure and therefore deny any infringe-
ment of a basic right. 
5 Governance and Implementation  
5.1 Distribution of Competences 
The Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) as unem-
ployment insurance agency is responsible for UB I payment as well as for 
the implementation of active labour market policy laid down in the Third 
Book of the Social Code (SGB III). The BA is a corporation under public 
law (§ 367(1) SGB III). The Bundesagentur für Arbeit is not only respon-
sible for unemployment insurance but also for the implementation of ac-
tive labour market policy laid down in the Third Book of the Social Code 
(SGB III). 
Whereas the institutions of the social insurance are in principle adminis-
tered as federal corporations under public law (Art. 87(2) GG), the distri-
bution of competence for basic income support of jobseekers (Grundsi-
cherung) is less clear. It was disputed for a long time. The optional as-
signment of competence to the local authorities is the result of negotia-
tions between the Federal and the Länder governments.  
Basic income for needy jobseekers ensues from the concurrent legislative 
power in respect of “public welfare” under Art. 74(1) no. 7 GG. In the case 
of persons “capable of working”, this basic security for jobseekers super-
sedes both the public welfare benefit of unemployment assistance and 
that of social assistance. The uniform federal regulation is deemed neces-
sary both for the establishment of equal living conditions and for the 
maintenance of legal and economic unity.  
The obligatory establishment of joint offices (ARGEn) under § 44b SGB II 
is highly problematical from a constitutional point of view. It involves a 
form of mixed administration that is not admissible. This poses a threat to 
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the principles governing the autonomous performance of functions and the 
clear assignment of responsibility.  
5.2 Changes in the Organizational Setting  
The Hartz reforms changed the general framework in which the delivery of 
employment services operates. Hartz III (2004) and Hartz IV (2005) en-
tailed big changes in the realm of employment services. In the past and 
especially after the already mentioned “placement scandal” the PES 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit, BA) were blamed for operating inefficiently and 
customer-unfriendly. The aim of Hartz III was therefore to improve the 
performance by streamlining public employment services. At the begin-
ning of 2004, changes concerning the organisational structure of the BA 
became effective (Hartz III). 
But nearly simultaneously - with the merger of unemployment and social 
assistance schemes - an external reorganisation of employment services 
took place. Joint agencies combining former local PES and municipal social 
assistance (Arbeitsgemeinschaften, ARGEn) for recipients of the basic in-
come support were set up by Hartz IV in 2005.  
The parallel internal and external re-organisation of employment services 
created a more fragmented structure. Instead of implementing one-stop-
shops for all jobseekers – an explicit objective of the Hartz commission – a 
two-tier or even three-tier system was created: 178 local PES agencies 
are responsible for the short-term unemployed and 356 ARGEn for the 
long-term unemployed and other claimants of the basic security benefit. 
The institutional setting is even more complicated by considering the 19 
districts where the long-term unemployed are dealt with separately by 
municipalities and local PES offices and 69 municipalities (Optionskommu-
nen) which could opt out for taking over the re-integration of the new UB 
II benefit recipients without PES participation. This new structure of ad-
ministrative bodies - a result of protracted federal negotiations - created 
serious governance problems.  
5.3 BA Jobcenters for the Short-term Unemployed  
The local PES offices are foremost responsible for the unemployment in-
surance benefit (UB I) recipients. Within this regime the Federal Employ-
ment Service - the Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA) - has a unified structure 
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with the three main services - placement, active labour market policy and 
unemployment insurance benefit (UB I) payments - being steered by one 
public body with administrative autonomy. UB I is mainly financed by 
compulsory social insurance contributions which are raised from depend-
ent employment covered by unemployment insurance and formally di-
vided in paritarian manner between employers and employees. The un-
employment insurance is a self-governing para-fiscal agency with code-
termination rights by the social partners. Although contributions and 
benefits are defined by legislation, it has far reaching autonomy concern-
ing the regulation of implementation. The proper provision of labour mar-
ket programmes, however, was always conducted by third parties, mostly 
by non-profit third sector organisations and – to a minor extend – by for-
profit organisations. Most recent reforms have withdrawn the influence of 
the social partners with respect to the regulation of labour market ser-
vices. Since 2003 tripartite codetermination of the BA is limited to the 
administrative council, which only has a controlling function, while the ex-
ecutive committee is set up limited in time.  
The Bundesagentur für Arbeit was modernised along the lines of the New 
Public Management. In accordance with a goal-oriented labour market pol-
icy, the former management-by-directives approach has been replaced by 
a management-by-objectives approach. Now quantitative goals are set for 
each local office taking into account the special circumstances in their local 
labour market. The formerly hierarchically organised employment offices 
were converted into customer- oriented job centres (Kundenzentren).  
The main objectives of the new BA are the effective and efficient use of 
the measures provided by the Third Book of the Social Code (SGB III) as 
well as transparency about how and with which results unemployment in-
surance funds are spent. Cost-effectiveness in the specific context of each 
regional labour office is the key criteria when choosing programme con-
tents and participants. Improved targeting of active measures and the al-
location of measures and resources opened up a wider scope for fitting 
clients to measures more individually. Provision of services has been de-
centralised with the aim of bringing BA activities closer to the specific, in-
dividual needs of the clients of the BA. The caseload of advisers is to be 
reduced and every jobseeker is assigned to a fix caseworker. The use of 
market mechanisms by outsourcing placement services to external pro-
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viders through placement vouchers or via subsidised temporary work 
(PSA) has been implemented as a complementary option to improve effi-
ciency and effectiveness of core employment services (Konle-Seidl 
2005a). 
Profiling of jobseekers constitutes an essential element in the BA reform 
process. It has been applied since 2005. Beyond the diagnostic function 
profiling in the German PES serves as a tool for customer segmentation 
and the determination of individual assistance and - last but not least - as 
an instrument for the allocation of resources. The unemployed jobseekers 
are segmented into four categories: 
1. “market clients”, considered to be job ready and to have the highest 
chances of finding employment,  
2. “clients for counselling and activation” range second and mainly 
need to be activated in their job search or minor adjustments of 
skills through short training, 
3. “clients for counselling and qualification” need more attention and 
will likely to be assigned to  training programmes and other meas-
ures to increase mobility or flexibility,  
4. “intensive assistance clients” require special attention since they 
face the lowest chances of re-employment and are at risk of becom-
ing long-term unemployed.  
The assignment to one of the four categories determines the future treat-
ment. Based on the individual profiling result tailor-made action programs 
(Handlungsprogramme) for each client group are developed. The action 
programs determine resource allocation. Personal resources and active 
measures should be allocated in an effective and efficient way. Six differ-
ent action programmes have been developed:  
• quick and sustainable placement for group (1), 
• change of perspective for group (2), 
• reduction of employment barriers  
• and qualification measures for group (3), 
• preservation of marketability and 
• case management for group (4). 
At the end of the intake interview caseworker and jobseeker agree on an 
action plan specifying individual “integration objectives” and resources.  
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Within the comprehensive scientific evaluation of the Hartz reforms on be-
half of the government, the preliminary results of Hartz III focuses on the 
effectiveness of placement services after the (still ongoing) reorganisation 
of the local employment offices. The study by WZB/infas using a condi-
tional Difference-in Difference-analysis exploits the fact that the new cus-
tomer-oriented one-stop centres have been introduced at different points 
in time. Employment service offices that have already transformed into 
one-stop-centres are matched to agencies that have not. Data is used 
from the inflow into unemployment of the respective agencies. The results 
indicate positive effects of customer-centres on the integration into regu-
lar employment, though the effects are not significant. This might be due 
to the fact that the number of agencies used in the analysis is small and 
the observation period at the present time is a maximum of nine months. 
In 2007 the final evaluation results based on a longer observation period 
will be presented (Bundesregierung 2006). 
Beyond the econometric measured effects on the individual reintegration 
chances the monitoring results from the BA controlling system provide in-
formation on the achievement of the Agency’s operational goals. Although 
there are no studies available on causal efficiency gains from the BA re-
form there are hints that the strict outcome oriented performance man-
agement shows after two years of fundamental and ongoing reforms al-
ready some positive results. The number of unemployment insurance 
benefit recipients (UB I) decreased in 2005 by six percent compared to 
the previous year. The transition rate from unemployment to employment 
(promoted by active measures as well as “just” by placement without ex-
tra financial resources) could be improved by 12 percent. Especially the 
increased number of job-to-job integrations and the early intervention 
measures to avoid long-term unemployment contributed to a lower stock 
of UB I recipients in 2005 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2006a).  
Consequently the “penalty tax” to be paid by the Agency if being unable to 
integrate its clients into work during the regular UB I entitlement period, 
was by 30 percent lower than expected. However, the most visible suc-
cess seems to be the spectacular cost reduction and the expected surplus 
of EUR 10 billions in 2006. For more than one decade the financial balance 
of the contribution based receipts and expenditures of the BA was defi-
cient. The Agency itself assessed that efficiency gains from the BA reform 
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contributed to one third, extra effects and the positive influence of an im-
proved business cycle for two thirds to the surplus (Bundesagentur für Ar-
beit 2006a). 
However, there are also critical assessments deriving from the success 
oriented overall strategy of the BA concerning the treatment of different 
client groups. The strict orientation of the management towards effective-
ness and efficiency aims at achieving net effects just of the insurance 
based resources. The new concept regarding the allocation of resources 
between client groups concentrates the Agency’s resources and activities 
on the “clients for counselling” who, though not easy to find jobs for, still 
have a fair chance, in the short term, of being integrated into the labour 
market.  
This change might, however, run the risk of disadvantaging the “intensive 
assistance clients” who have very poor chances of finding a job as such 
people will benefit less frequently from active labour market measures. 
Expensive and long lasting programmes for the intensive assistance cli-
ents may in the Agency’s management logic not pay off. Moreover, in the 
cost-benefit logic the “penalty tax” worsens further the treatment per-
spectives for the hard-to-place client group. While participating in long-
lasting programmes a transition for intensive assistance clients into em-
ployment before exhausting the UB I claim (12 or 18 months for 55+) is 
rather unlikely the Agency has to pay additionally to the programme costs 
the “penalty tax”. As a consequence, the incentives for the BA to “park” 
the hard-to-place clients are strong. But more than to blame the Agency 
for neglecting the fulfilment of social tasks it is the institutional setting of 
the German unemployment regime - contribution based UB I and tax fi-
nanced UB II administered by different institutions -  which generates a 
trade-off between the fulfilment of social and efficiency tasks (Konle-
Seidl/Schewe 2007). 
5.4 ARGE Jobcenters and Municipal Agencies for the 
Long-term Unemployed  
The original idea to create joint customer centres which was supposed to 
end the different treatment of recipients of unemployment insurance 
benefits and unemployment assistance (dealt with by BA) on the one hand 
and social assistance on the other hand (administered by the municipali-
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ties) did not work for political reasons. A major goal of combining UA and 
SA benefits in one single means-tested income replacement schemes for 
persons who are able to work was therefore to reduce the administrative 
overhead inherent in the old system and to arrive at more coherent acti-
vation strategies for all persons on welfare benefits that are able to work. 
However, financing and decision powers with respect to employment poli-
cies remain dispersed in important respects. 
The introduction of Unemployment Benefit II in 2005 was combined with 
the creation of joint bodies of BA and the municipalities - the ARGE con-
sortia – that are now in charge of administrating ALG II and designing 
employment services for benefit recipients in all districts except for re-
gions where the municipalities opted for taking over the complete respon-
sibility and for the districts with continued division of responsibilities.  
But despite the joint framework, the financial responsibilities as well as 
the decision powers within the ARGEn are divided. The local authorities 
are responsible for reimbursement of accommodation, heating and one-
time costs for e.g. initial furnishing and clothes, child care services, as 
well as debt, drug and socio-psychological counselling according § 16 (2) 
sent.1 SGB II. The BA agencies are responsible for the payment of UB II 
as well as for all activation measures (SGB III and SGB II). Funding for 
these services is provided out of the federal budget. Additionally, about 30 
percent of the housing and heating costs are also financed out of the fed-
eral budget.  
Whereas the federal burden of funding of ALG II, related employment ser-
vices and housing costs for the federal government went up, municipal 
responsibility with respect to the implementation of labour market policy 
increased. The municipalities can free-ride in their decisions at the ex-
pense of the state budget. As the municipalities maintain the financial re-
sponsibility for income support for persons who are not able to work (so-
cial assistance), the municipalities have an incentive to shift costs by clas-
sifying persons as being able to work who would otherwise obtain munici-
pal social assistance. Indeed, in 2005 more than 90 percent of the former 
SA recipients were assessed to be “capable of working” and therefore 
transferred to the federal funded ALG II system.  
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From unclear regulation of organisational competences concerning organ-
izational procedures arise a lot of administration problems within the  
ARGEn. Also the staff of the ARGEn remains employed by different public 
sector entities - the Federal Labour Office and the respective municipal-
ity - with differing contractual employment conditions such as working 
time and salaries. This has lead to frictions in the administration of the 
ARGEn. Difficulties in harmonising activation targets across regions be-
came apparent when the municipalities complained that the Federal La-
bour Office would hamper efficient job placement by centralistic ordi-
nances. In response, an agreement was made in October 2005 between 
the federal government, the BA and the municipalities that leave the de-
termination of operational targets for the ARGE to their governing council. 
However, the agreement could not solve so far the fundamental govern-
ance problems often described as “clash of cultures” between a more cen-
tralistic BA staff and the municipal staff used to decide on a greater dis-
cretional leeway.  
The fact that derives from the division of responsibilities between national 
and local governments is one reason for increased compensation by the 
federal government because of benefit over-run for the ALG II scheme. 
The in-congruency between spending and decision powers at the different 
layers of government inhibits a more efficient management of employ-
ment policies for the long-term unemployed. With the “option clause” 
available until 2010, 69 municipalities have been given temporarily exclu-
sive competence for administering the new system, the segmentation of 
employment services was further aggravated (Konle-Seidl 2005b).  
A comparative quasi-experimental evaluation of the two different imple-
mentation systems required by federal law is under way. The evaluation 
results will partly determine the further assignment of employment ser-
vices to the municipalities or a strengthening of decision rights of the BA 
within the ARGE. Nevertheless, if responsibilities for UB II related policies 
are assigned to municipalities this should be accompanied by a financing 
mechanism providing incentives for the municipalities to engage in effi-
cient job placement. 
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Table 3: Institutional Responsibilities  
Regime Unemployment Insurance  Basic Income Support  
Regulation Third Book of the Social Secu-
rity Code (SGB III) 
Second Book of the Social 
Security Code (SGB II) 
Target groups Short-term unemployed Needy persons capable of 
working; partners and de-
pendants 
Benefits Unemployment Insurance Bene-
fit (UB I) 
Basic Income (UB II and 
Sozialgeld) 
Funding Compulsory social insurance 
contributions and deficit cover-
age by Federal government 
General taxes at Federal 
level (income support and 
activation measures and 
part of housing and heating 
costs) and municipalities 
(2/3 of housing and heating 
costs) 
Administration Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA); 
regional and local employment 
offices   
ARGE jobcentres (joint 
bodies by BA and munici-
palities), municipalities opt-
ing out (Optionskommu-
nen) or divided structures  
 
5.5 Implementation  
The binding element between legal provisions concerning activation policy 
and the effects of such a policy on an individual level is the implementa-
tion by local agencies. Concerning the demanding part of activation, this 
means foremost stricter monitoring of job search efforts and programme 
participation and the practice in imposing sanctions in case of an in-
fringement of the rules. 
The Hartz reforms tightened benefit conditionality with respect to avail-
ability for work and program participation and introduced more flexibility 
regarding sanctioning. The objective of a stricter regulation rests on the 
fact that hardly any sanctions were imposed under the former law or were 
not asserted with the necessary intensity. Although sanctioning via tem-
porary suspension of UB payments was in principle possible already in the 
past, available information indicates that until the recent reforms counsel-
lors of the local employment offices rarely decided to impose sanctions, 
and the sanctions advocated were often not executed (Wilke 2003).  
More recently, the rate of sanctioning has slightly increased, but the dis-
persion in the application of sanctions between local employment offices 
appears to have been large and to have increased as well 
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(Oschmiansky/Müller 2005). This means that despite the fact that legal 
aspects allow in principle no margin of discretion in practice there is a 
“though” and “soft” interpretation of legal provisions by employment of-
fices.  
Table 4 shows that the sanction rate for UB I recipients has slightly in-
creased between 2004 and 2005. In general, however, sanction intensity 
is still rather low in Germany.  
Table 4: Sanction Rates in Unemployment Insurance (UB I) 
 20042 20052 
Sanctions1 imposed on unemployment insur-
ance benefit recipients (a) 
168.293  150.887 
Specific sanctions for  missing early registra-
tion requirement and job search interviews 
(Meldeversäumnis) (b)  
n. a. 110.247 
  261.134 
As a percentage of sanctions (a) 
Voluntary quits 6.7 7.6 
Refusal of suitable job offer  2.7 2.03 
Refusal of participation in ALMP scheme  3.1 2.4 
Quit of ALMP  2.0 1.3 
As a percentage of the total inflow of unem-
ployment insurance benefit recipients 
 
9% 
 
10% 
1  On average 6 % of all imposed sanctions (benefit stops) were lifted after successful legal action. 
2  Figure covers seven months only (May – December). 3 Includes in 2005 for the first time (4.100) 
cases of sanctioning for insufficient job search. 
Source:  Bundesagentur für Arbeit. 
 
Data on sanctions according to § 31 SGB II for UB II recipients are not 
available yet. An internal audit report in nine ARGEn, however, came to 
the conclusion that just in 21 percent of all cases of obvious non-
compliance sanctions were imposed. In a recent review the Federal Audit 
Office complained among the most serious deficits implementing the new 
system that benefits for the long-term unemployed were paid without suf-
ficient monitoring of eligibility; that intake interviews took place too late, 
that in half of the proofed cases personal  integration agreements were 
not concluded and that activation proposals were not pursued seriously in 
4 out of 10 cases and finally that in six out of ten cases non-compliance of 
rules was not sanctioned (Bundesrechnungshof 2006).  
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Critics were also raised about the requirement of “public interest” con-
cerning public work. “One Euro Jobs” are a good example to demonstrate 
the still insufficient implementation of the Fördern und Fordern principles 
of activation. On the one hand these jobs have been designed to promote 
the employability of unemployed persons with a bad prognosis for a quick 
integration into the regular labour market. On the other hand these jobs 
serve as a work-test for individuals with good chances but low search ef-
forts. At the same time, earning an additional EUR 1.00 to 1.50 for every 
hour worked in public employment for six to nine months at 30 hours a 
week while full benefit receipt is continued may reduce search intensity 
and lead to a certain lock-in effect (Cichorek/Koch/Walwei 2005). 
Results from a survey of case managers carried out in fall 2005 show that 
One Euro Jobs are partially implemented as a work-test, however in most 
cases One Euro Jobs are offered on a voluntary basis, i.e. on a consensual 
basis. Case managers see their prime objective in re-establishing or stabi-
lizing employability and in strengthening societal integration through 
structuring daily life, improved self-confidence and additional resources for 
dept redemption. Immediate reintegration into the labour market is not a 
principle objective of this scheme (Wolff/Hohmeyer 2006).  
One Euro Jobs are by far the most frequently used activation scheme in 
SGB II active labour market policy (figure 3). In fall 2006 about 15 per-
cent of all UB II recipients participated in active schemes, approximately 
half of them in One Euro Jobs.  
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Figure 3: Activating Interventions under SGB II 
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Although more staff was assigned to local ARGE offices in order to reach a 
workload of one caseworker responsible for 75 clients, the actual workload 
is still much higher - especially for UB II recipients older than 25 (1 to 
200) whereas the average workload with respect to young people (1 to 
77) nearly met the fixed target in 2005 already (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 
2005).  
However, there is – up to now - not more than anecdotal evidence con-
cerning the real service delivery process and the transactions between 
caseworkers and clients at the front-line. Little is known about keeping the 
promise to provide modern tailor-made services according to the individ-
ual needs of their clients. Little is also known about the view of personal 
advisers on their role under an activation regime. They normally see 
themselves as helping professionals and not to as government agents 
aiming at altering the personal behaviour of their clients. Advisers and 
case-managers are convinced that due to the high long-term unemploy-
ment there are very limited job opportunities on the regular labour market 
for their clientele. Stricter monitoring of availability criteria and job search 
as well as sanctioning in case of non-compliance is therefore perceived as 
not very helpful. In this context the availability of One Euro Jobs is a very 
useful tool for advisers to provide time-limited job opportunities for the 
large group of hard-to-place UB II recipients.  
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The possible failure to fully implement reforms on the frontline has also 
implications for equity in service provision. One aim of the SGB II is to 
give more discretion to local employment offices and to provide more co-
operative instruments in order to permit necessary adjustments to the in-
dividual case and simultaneously handing back unemployed individuals 
the necessary responsibility for their lives. The strong codification (Ver-
rechtlichung) of the status of individuals under German employment pro-
motion law (SGB III) was often deplored and assessed as stabilizing a 
status quo that is more or less resistant to reform. However, strong fears 
are raised that the way in which the new system is configured, i.e. provid-
ing less enforceable claims and judicial controls of the labour administra-
tion imply a weaker legal position with a weakening of the position of indi-
viduals. However, the greater degree of flexibility of activation at the local 
level does not mean that UB II beneficiaries do not have access to legal 
advice or the right to file a lawsuit.  
6 Outcomes of Activation: A Preliminary  
Assessment  
It is also much too early to assess the effects of the policy shift towards 
activation on employment, unemployment or distributional outcomes with 
empirical data. At this stage, there are no empirical studies on the micro-
level regarding changes in the duration of unemployment spells, the re-
turn to employment, the quality of subsequent employment and the ef-
fects of activating interventions. The same holds for potential explanations 
of developments on the macro-level except for a study that shows an in-
crease in matching efficiency due to the Hartz reforms (Fahr/Sunde 2006). 
At this point in time only a preliminary empirical assessment is possible. 
However, causal statements can hardly be made. In addition, some find-
ings can be based on simulation studies and on comparisons between 
benefit levels and equivalent market wages.  
6.1 Open Unemployment 
The peak in registered unemployment in early 2005 with more than five 
millions unemployed, an all-time high, is largely due the combination of 
seasonal effects and the statistical effect of (capable of working) former 
social assistance recipients and their partners being registered as unem-
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ployed for the first time after Hartz IV came into force. This explains an 
increase in unemployment of about 350.000 to 400.000. In that sense, 
Hartz IV contributed to more open unemployment by providing greater 
transparency in German labour market statistics as former social assis-
tance recipients capable of working are now more “visible“. At the same 
time, hidden unemployment decreased so that broad unemployment re-
mained stable (Konle-Seidl/Lang 2006, see table 5).  
Table 5:  Broad unemployment in Germany (1.000 persons) 
 1998 2004 2005 
Registered unemployment 4.281 4.381 4.754 
Participants in active labour market 
schemes 
695 845 768 
Public job creation (SGB III) 269 180 67 
Public employment opportunities (SGB II) 0 16 126 
Hidden labour force (Stille Reserve) 1.244 1.068 758 
Total  6.489 6.490 6.473 
Note: medium projection for 2005. Source: BA and IAB; Konle-Seidl/Lang 2006.  
 
The recent decline in registered unemployment to less than 4 millions in 
November 2006, however, can in part be explained by a positive economic 
environment. There may be some motivation effect of Hartz IV on the un-
employed in the sense that the eventual transfer to means-tested and 
flat-rate UB II increases search intensity and reduces reservation wages 
during the receipt of UB I. However, there is no systematic evidence on 
this so far. 
6.2 Benefit Receipt  
On the other hand, recent data on the number of beneficiaries show that 
there is a divergent development of transfer receipt in UB I and UB II. 
While figures of UB I receipt, i.e. short-term unemployment, decline, the 
number of UB II beneficiaries has increased considerable over the last 24 
months. This means that the coverage of the unemployed by insurance 
benefits declines whereas reliance on basic income becomes more impor-
tant. The relation is now approximately four fifths on UB II and one fifth 
on UB I (figure 4). Hence, basic income is of growing relevance regarding 
the structure of benefits in the German welfare state. Compared to unem-
ployment insurance benefits, means-tested basic income is now the more 
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important welfare scheme. However, most recent figures also show some 
decline in UB II.  
Figure 4:  Recipients of Unemployment Benefits I and II, 2004-2006 
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While the number of UB II beneficiaries increased strongly, data on indi-
vidual benefit spells in 2005 shows that there is considerable mobility in 
and out of UB II (Graf/Rudolph 2006). About 74 percent of all households 
in need in January 2005 depended on benefits throughout the year while 
26 percent could leave UB II. Households entering UB II later in 2005 had 
a higher chance of leaving basic income support within 12 months (43 
percent). Continued benefit dependency over twelve months was most 
frequent with lone parents who could opt for an exemption from the job 
search requirement.  
6.3 Earnings 
However, UB II is not only received by long-term unemployed, but also by 
people entering the labour force and by employees or self-employed with-
out sufficient earnings to pass the threshold of guaranteed basic income. 
In this respect it is most notable to see that about one million of all UB II 
recipients have income from earnings, i.e. about one fifth of all UB II 
beneficiaries are employed on either low hours or low wages (Bundes-
agentur für Arbeit 2006b). Only a smaller share of UB II recipients works 
full-time (see figures 5 and 6). But due to current earnings disregard 
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clauses, there are strong incentives to work part-time and top-up low 
earnings from low hours by UB II (Aufstocker). Through this arrangement, 
UB beneficiaries can earn EUR 160 on top of their benefit through part-
time work, in particular with the Minijob arrangement that provides for 
flexible jobs with an earnings ceiling of EUR 400 per month exempt from 
employees’ social insurance contributions and taxes. This concerns about 
500.000 people. They can hardly improve their net income by moving to 
longer working hours as additional earnings lead to benefit withdrawal. 
Hence, Hartz IV provides for a general und unlimited in-work benefit and 
strong part-time incentives. This also means that benefit recipients are 
relatively indifferent when faced with wage cuts imposed by employers in 
sectors not covered by collective agreements.  
Figure 5:  Earnings Combined with UB II Receipt, September 2005 
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Figure 6:  Distribution of UB II Recipients’ Income from Work, September 2005 
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The part-time incentive is particularly relevant with respect to needy 
households with dependent children where realistic equivalent market 
wages to be earned when moving from long-term unemployment to regu-
lar jobs with low qualification requirements in the private service sector 
are close or even inferior to the benefit level (Boss/Christensen/Schrader 
2005, Brenke 2006, Cichorek/Koch/Walwei 2005, see table 6). Employ-
ment disincentives are more significant in these cases, and part-time work 
will provide for an additional earnings top-up. This does not only hold for 
earnings from regular part-time but also for One Euro Jobs that provide 
approximately EUR 1.00 to 1.50 per hour in addition to full benefits.  
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Table 6:  Benefit Levels and Equivalent Market Wages  
 
equivalent 
wages equivalent wages 
 
Net benefits from 
UB II + social al-
lowance for de-
pendents + hous-
ing/heating bene-
fit (+ temporary 
supplement) 
net 
hourly 
wage 
(40 h per 
week) 
gross 
hourly 
wage 
(40  
h per 
week) 
UB II 
+ compensa-
tion for pub-
lic employ-
ment oppor-
tunity of € 
1.50 at 30 h 
per week 
net hourly 
wage (40 h 
per week) 
gross hourly 
wage (40 h 
per week) 
 in EUR per month 
Single 662 - 822 3.10 - 4.40 
3.70 - 
5.65 857 - 1017 
4.70 - 
5.90 6.10 - 8.10 
Single par-
ent, one 
child 
1090 - 1310 3.35 - 4.95 
4.20 - 
6.30 1285 - 1505 
4.75 - 
7.00 5.95 - 9.95 
Married, 
single 
earner 
1034 - 1354 5.65 - 7.80 
7.10 - 
9.80 1229 - 1549 
7.10 - 
8.95 8.90 - 11.50 
Married, 
single 
earner, two 
children 
1574 - 2014 3.80 - 7.35 
4.80 - 
9.25 1769 - 2209 
5.30 - 
8.55 6.35 - 10.90 
Net hourly wages include child benefit, child supplement for low-wage earners and housing benefit. 
Source: IAB (Cichorek/Koch/Walwei 2005). 
 
6.4 Public Expenditure 
Regarding public expenditures, the implementation of Hartz IV in 2005 led 
to higher rather than lower public expenditure and to an increase rather 
than a decline in the number of benefit recipients as compared to 2004. 
This has to do  not only with incorrect prior estimations (due to unreliable 
statistics) but also with some legal provisions that allow for individual 
benefit receipt by young unemployed, migrants and fake single house-
holds, but also to the unintended emergence of a broad in-work benefit 
scheme. For 2006, planned expenditures amount to EUR 47 billions (figure 
7). However, actual expenditure might reach about EUR 50 billions which 
is approximately EUR 10 billions more that expected at the outset. At the 
same time, however, unemployment insurance will run a surplus of about 
EUR 10 billions. Expenditure increases in UB II and related active labour 
market policies reflects the shift from unemployment insurance to basic 
income which also means a shift from contribution-based to tax-funded 
passive and active labour market policy schemes (Kaltenborn/Schiwarov 
2006a, 2006, Kaltenborn/Knerr/Schiwarov 2006). 
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Figure 7:  Expenditure for Active and Passive Labour Market Policies 
in Assistance Schemes before and after the Reform 
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6.5 Poverty 
There is no information so far on the effects of the shift towards activation 
in Germany on unemployment duration or on stability and quality of sub-
sequent employment. The same holds empirical evidence driven impact on 
wage dispersion and inequality before and after taxes and benefits. This 
will only become available later. However, simulation studies (Becker/ 
Hauser 2006 see figure 8) point at a slight increase in poverty due to 
Hartz IV although this studies do not take into account potential dynamic 
effects on reemployment. As with changes in benefit generosity, the effect 
on poverty is assumed to be most pronounced in East Germany.  
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Figure 8:  Poverty Before and After Hartz IV  
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6.6 Overall Assessment  
Although it is rather early for a preliminary assessment of the outcomes of 
the shift towards activation in Germany, empirical information available so 
far suggests at a differentiated judgment. On the one hand, empirical evi-
dence shows a remarkable shift to a more goal- and efficiency-oriented 
approach within contribution-based active schemes administered by BA. 
Interim results on the evaluation of BA reorganization also show positive 
results (Bundesregierung 2006) as do empirical studies on matching effi-
ciency (Fahr/Sunde 2006), yet some of the evaluation studies on specific 
active labour market programs within unemployment insurance are a bit 
inconclusive (Bundesregierung 2006, Jacobi/Kluve 2006). Stronger profil-
ing and goal-orientation in the assignment of active schemes to short-
term unemployed helps explain the savings in contribution-based active 
and passive labour market policies even though actual sanctioning is mod-
erate.  
The situation is different, however, with respect to activation of the long-
term unemployment under SGB II, i.e. recipients of UB II. Effects on 
benefit levels are highly differentiated with respect to household composi-
tion and prior earnings. Yet, there has not been a bold cut in benefit gen-
erosity, but even some expansion. At the same time, current benefits are 
equal or even superior to equivalent market wages for people with a low 
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earnings potential in the private sector. In such a system, activation cru-
cially depends on frontline implementation of demanding and enabling 
schemes and the actual application of benefit conditionality. But anecdotal 
evidence and some partial empirical data suggest a moderate approach 
towards activation in actual practice, i.e. regarding use of integration 
agreements, work test or sanctions. 
The moderate level of activation in practice may be explained by several 
factors: disincentives embodied in the existing funding and governance 
arrangements in particular with regard to effective activation of potential 
long-term unemployed; a high level of legal codification which, together 
with a lack of a coherent normative framework and ambiguous institu-
tional incentives, may lead to reluctant implementation in local agencies 
and by frontline staff. In addition, the perceived, but also actual lack of 
jobs for the low-skilled may hamper activation through job offers and in-
hibit entry into gainful employment.  
This is not only to be explained by weak labour demand due to unfavour-
able business cycle conditions in 2005 and early 2006, i.e. until recently, 
but also by institutional preconditions limiting labour market flexibility and 
wage dispersion while at same time creating strong incentives to combine 
benefit receipt with partial labour market attachment only. The difficulty of 
entering the German labour market is largely due to the fact that policies 
create specific compartments or segments of low-wage and flexible em-
ployment such as benefit top-up/Minijobs, subsidized employment and 
One Euro Jobs with transitions to higher wages or more stable employ-
ment being rather problematic.  
A partial liberalization in dismissal protection, the easing of restrictions on 
temporary agency work and product market regulations such as the lifting 
of the requirement of a master craftman’s diploma (Meisterbrief) in some 
crafts sectors was certainly not sufficient in this respect (Eichhorst/Kaiser 
2006). It was not possible to implement more far-reaching reforms that 
could stimulate labour demand and increase the supply of entry-level 
jobs. 
7 Summary and Outlook  
Germany embarked on the shift towards activation much later that its 
European neighbours, but this policy change was in many respects more 
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fundamental and comprehensive as it implied a major break with the wel-
fare state tradition which had been characterized by the social insurance 
logic of a “Bismarckian” system. Passive, status protecting benefits had 
been used in the past to buffer economic adjustment. Against this back-
ground, policy change from status and occupational orientation in favour 
of basic income support for the long-term unemployed in combination with 
stricter formulation and potential enforcement of “sleeping” demanding 
elements is a major element of “path departure” and recalibration of 
rights and obligations in the German welfare state. This also implied a ma-
jor overhaul of active labour market policy schemes and governance. But 
the shift towards activation is not just a “technical” issue and an example 
of implementing New Public Management principles in Germany.  
The late, but fundamental change in Germany is most notable in compari-
son with other European countries such as the UK, Denmark, the Nether-
lands or Sweden as the German approach to activation is relatively broad 
and ambitious as “capability of working” is defined mainly in a medical 
sense so that the number of people to be activated is much higher than 
elsewhere, in particular given the fact that alternative escape routes do 
not play a prominent role in Germany these days (i.e. disability benefits) 
or are being closed (e.g. early retirement). This dramatically increases 
transparency regarding non-employment and lead to high open (regis-
tered) unemployment at the beginning of the activation of the long-term 
unemployed with the Hartz IV reform.  
Contrary to widespread perceptions, however, stronger activation is not 
associated with a general decline in benefit levels – even not for the long-
term unemployed – as Hartz IV is not only activation, but also a social 
policy reform widening access to benefits and assistance. Rather the sev-
erance of the link between benefits for the long-term unemployed and 
prior earnings changed the perception of benefit generosity. This may – in 
conjunction with more demanding interventions by administrative bodies – 
change job search effort due to increased fears of downward mobility in 
case of longer unemployment spells (Eichhorst/Sesselmeier 2006).  
This has more fundamental consequences as it signals the departure from 
status protection and a “benevolent” welfare state to a more basic, 
means-tested system of social protection and stricter “workfare”. This is 
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not only a result of the abolition of earnings-related unemployment assis-
tance but also due to the associated cut in maximum duration of unem-
ployment insurance benefits for older workers. In empirical terms this be-
comes evident with respect to the diminishing role of contribution-based 
and earnings-related unemployment insurance benefits relative to the 
number of beneficiaries of means-tested basic income schemes.  
Basic income for jobseekers, but also means-tested earnings top-up for 
low-wage earners is now by far the more important benefit scheme than 
unemployment insurance for short-term unemployed with sufficient prior 
employment record. This new arrangements questions the status of life-
time achievement and occupational orientation that was characteristic for 
the German model of industrial production in the past. On the one hand, 
this may reduce incentives to pursue professional careers as acquired 
rights in the social insurance system depreciate more quickly than in the 
past, and after (accelerated) expiry of unemployment insurance benefits, 
virtually all jobs are suitable. On the other hand, however, reduced benefit 
generosity in case of long-term unemployment and even the threat of be-
ing transferred to means-tested flat-rate basic income may lead to higher 
individual effort in order not to lose track of the regular labour market and 
raise individual job search intensity in case of unemployment. This may 
even have positive effects on human capital investment. Anyway, the re-
form reinforces individual responsibility and reduces the possibility to rely 
on status-oriented benefits and human capital enhancing labour market 
policies. 
Given this broad paradigm shift, acceptance deficits come as no surprise. 
Cuts in UB I duration, replacing earnings-related unemployment assis-
tance with a flat-rate benefit for the long-term unemployed and fears of 
“enforced” low-wage employment as a result of stricter activation moti-
vated major public unrest before and after the Hartz IV reform came into 
effect. However, despite a broad public controversy, the long-term impli-
cations of this institutional change remain rather implicit. Part of the ac-
ceptance deficit can be explained by the lack of a general normative 
framework developed in order to explain the necessity of these changes 
and to emphasize the potential of this reform. This may also be partly re-
sponsible for reluctant implementation in practice as the implicit norma-
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tive assumptions are not shared by all actors charged with implementa-
tion.  
The difficulties experienced with the politics and the implementation of 
activation in Germany points at more fundamental issues as both policy 
makers and the general public are very reluctant with regard to a com-
plementary liberalization of the labour market and higher wage dispersion 
which would help strengthen the supply of entry jobs for the activated. 
The concept of “work first” may be embodied in current German legisla-
tion, yet the idea of “any job is better than no job” still raises widespread 
opposition. Hence, the question whether a higher degree of inequality is 
inevitable in the general labour market in order to overcome benefit de-
pendency is still unsolved. Being accustomed to a “high equality, low ac-
tivity” arrangement, activation of the long-term unemployed and the low-
skilled implies a major shift of paradigm. However, at the same time, try-
ing to avoid low-wage employment means tacit acceptance not only of 
inequality, but also poverty outside the labour market and of inequality 
between core and margin of the labour market.  
With regard to foreseeable future, the German activation regime is most 
probably not a stable one. One more coherent policy solution implying a 
general lowering of basic income is virtually ruled out, therefore there is 
no prominent role for strong in-work benefits (see e.g. Sachverständigen-
rat 2006).  
This is also true for a broad flexibilization of the labour market which 
would be complementary to this approach inspired by the Anglo-Saxon 
experience. The public and policy makers are highly reserved with regard 
to these issues. Social justice consideration might rather result in at-
tempts at stabilizing wages through the introduction of a statutory mini-
mum wage even if this might be detrimental to the labour market integra-
tion of the long-term unemployed. Policy makers may even try to resort to 
a more limited definition of “capability of working” and assign part of the 
hard-to-place to public sector employment.  
We would rather expect future steps to fine-tune the system. Short-term 
fiscal considerations due to the unexpected inflow into the basic income 
system led to more restrictive eligibility criteria and stricter sanctioning 
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provisions as early as in summer 2006. Within the next years we might 
see some changes regarding targeted in-work benefits, a rather restrictive 
approach towards part-time incentives in the transfer system and a more 
general revision of administrative competences and funding which would 
help strengthen incentives for more efficient activation by BA, ARGEn and 
municipalities. Together with the relative decline of active schemes in the 
contribution-based system this may eventually lead to the more flexible 
repertoire of SGB II to become the relevant set of instruments in German 
active labour market policies. This may help activation without a formal 
lowering of social benefits.  
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